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SECTION 1985(3): A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO
TITLE VII FOR SEX-BASED
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States has been committed for more than a dec-
ade to the eradication of sex-based employment discrimination, it re-
mains a pervasive problem. There is continuing disparity in earning
power between men and women' that is partly due to the under-
representation of women in higher paying occupations,2 and reflects a
need for vigorous efforts to overcome the effects of sex discrimination.
Congress enacted Title VII3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-which
forbids employment discrimination on the basis of sex,4 race, color, re-
1. U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, Monthly Labor Review 36 (June,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Monthly Labor Review]. In 1975, women earned approximately 40% less
than their male counterparts. While the average man's income increases two and a half times after
the teen years and reaches its peak between ages 35 and 54, the average woman's earnings increase
less than twice after the teen years and stabilize between the ages of 35 and 54 at about 50% of the
average man's income. Id.
2. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, 24 Employment and Earnings 8
(Table 1) (January, 1977). Although women account for more than 40% of the labor force, only
9.2% of all lawyers and only 12.8% of all physicians are women. Monthly Labor Review, supra note
1, at 38.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 2000e-2(a) makes it an
unlawful employment practice "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
... ." See generally Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications
of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. Rav. 1 (1976); Katz, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment
Discrimination Charges Under Title VII: Employers'Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 877 (1977); Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69 (1977); Ralston, The Federal Government as Employer: Problems andIssues in
Enforcing the.4nti-Discrimination Laws, 10 GA. L. REv. 717 (1976); Sape & Hart, Title VIIRecon-
sidered" The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972);
Wells, Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 43 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 274 (1975); Winslow, Sex Discrimi-
nation in Employment: Current Federal Practice, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 515 (1975); Symposium-The
Second Decade of Title VII.. Refinement of the Remedies, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 433 (1975);
Comment, Title VII Seven Years fter, 32 MONT. L. Rav. 229 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination in
Employment: What has Title VII AccomplisAedfor the Female?, 9 U. RicH. L. REv. 149 (1974).
4. As originally proposed, Title VII did not apply to sex discrimination. See H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1963), reprintedin [19641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391. The
367
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ligion, or national origin-to check widespread and blatant employment
discrimination.5 Despite the success of Title VII suits in obtaining
significant back pay awards and spurring affirmative action pro-
grams,6 the burdensome and inflexible procedures of Title VII, 7 its in-
adequate remedies,' and its limited coverage9 have led victims of
employment discrimination to seek alternative methods of redress.' 0
Section 1981,11 which guarantees to all persons the same rights as
"white persons" to make and enforce contracts, has been used to com-
bat racially motivated employment discrimination, but has been held
inapplicable to sex-based discrimination.1 2 Section 198313 provides a
civil action for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or
federal statutes under color of state law, and can be used to remedy
sex-based employment discrimination if the litigant can prove state
prohibition against sex discrimination was later proposed by the opponents of the bill to aid in the
bill's defeat. The only Congressman initially supporting inclusion of sex discrimination within
Title VII voted against the final bill. 110 CONG. REc. 2804-05 (1964). See Note, Sex Discrimina-
tion in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 671, 677.
5. Recognizing the need to grant the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
authority to obtain enforcement of its orders, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 7, 86 Stat. 103. For the legislative
history, see H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 2137-38. As amended, Title VII establishes a five-member Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission authorized to investigate and conciliate discrimination charges, sets forth an exten-
sive procedure for the filing and processing of claims, grants the EEOC the power to sue ifconcili-
ation fails, and details remedies available to a complainant. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (Supp.
V 1975).
6. See note 33 infra.
7. See notes 20-30 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 31-39 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 40 infra.
10. When the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 7, 86 Stat.
103, was passed, the average woman earned 57.9% as much as the average man. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (1972). In 1975 the average woman's earnings represented
only 60% of the average man's and women constituted two-thirds of all workers earning less than
$5000. Monthl Labor Review, supra note I, at 40.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens ......
12. See note 59 infra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads: "Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any
State ... subjects... any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law .... "https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/5
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action. 14
For the victim of sex discrimination who can neither allege nor
prove state action, section 1985(3)"5 provides the only viable alternative
to Title VII. Section 1985(3) creates a cause of action against any per-
son who conspires to deprive another "of the equal protection of the
laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."'16 Since the
Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Breckenridge7 that a section 1985(3)
racial discrimination claim did not require state action, this section has
become a popular remedy for sex-based employment discrimination."8
Grffin, however, left unanswered the questions whether state action,
although not required for race discrimination claims, is necessary to
reach sex-based employment discrimination under section 1985(3);
whether the managers of a single business entity can conspire; and,
whether sex discrimination is sufficiently class-based to activate section
1985(3). After examining these questions, which have been inconsis-
tently answered by the lower courts, this Note concludes that section
14. Section 1985(3), enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment, also has been interpreted
to require state action. See notes 71-121 infra and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) reads:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the high-
way or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving either directly or indi-
rectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws;.., in any case of con-
spiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.
16. To state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege that 1) defendants
conspired for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of equal protection of the laws or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws; 2) the conspirators' actions were motivated by some racial or
other class-based invidiously discriminatory animus; and 3) plaintiff suffered injury to person or
property or was deprived of his rights or privileges as a citizen of the United States. Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones
v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ga.), aff'dper curlam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973). For a general
discussion of pleading under § 1985(3), see Brooks, Use ofthe Civil JRights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to
Redress Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 258 (1977).
17. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Reichardt v.
Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
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1985(3) provides a valuable method to achieve the goals of Title VII
while avoiding its inadequacies.
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF TITLE VII
In accord with a congressional preference for voluntary resolution of
employment discrimination charges,19 Title VII establishes extensive
procedures to be followed by the complainant and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in processing a complaint. A
complainant must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory practice.20 The EEOC then determines whether
there is reasonable cause for complaint,2 ' attempts to achieve a concili-
atory agreement, and may sue the employer if no agreement is
reached.22 Although the ultimate enforcement of Title VII lies with the
EEOC, the statute provides for a sixty day deferral of charges to state
agencies.23 Title VII also allows any aggrieved individual to bring suit
after the prescribed period for EEOC action has elapsed.24 The median
19. The legislative history of the Act stresses the EEOC's conciliatory role and views re-
course to the courts as extraordinary. 110 CONG. REc. 14190 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Morse); id. at
13088, 14443 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1975). Although the purpose of Title VII's 180 day filing
requirement is to avoid faded memories and lost evidence, seeNote, Limitation Periodsfor Filing a
Charge with the EEOC Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 56 B.U.L. REv. 760, 764
(1976), the principal result of the requirement has been to bar plaintiffs from joining parties or
adding claims to the initial EEOC complaint. Casey & Slaybod, Procedural Aspects of Title PIZ
Litigation: Pitfallsfor the Unwary4ttomey, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 87, 93-94 (1975); Developments in
the Law,-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act f1964, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 1109, 1202-03 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Employment Discrimination].
21. Id § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC has 120 days to determine whether the charge is based on
reasonable cause.
22. Id § 2000e-5(f). If it finds reasonable cause for the charge, the EEOC has 30 additional
days to achieve a conciliatory agreement and may sue the employer if no timely agreement is
reached.
23. Id § 2000e-5(c), (d). See EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. 1601.12 (1976). Deferral is
mandatory if the state fair employment practices agency operates under a statute similar to Title
VII and has enforcement powers analogous to those of the EEOC.
24. Id § 2000e-5(f)(l). If the EEOC dismisses the complaint, fails to achieve voluntary
compliance, or fails to file suit within 180 days of determining that the complaint is based on
reasonable cause, it must issue the complainant a "right-to-sue" letter which entitles him to insti-
tute suit within ninety days.
Theoretically, a court should be deprived ofjurisdiction under Title VII if the complainant or
the EEOC fails to satisfy any procedural requirement. In practice, however, courts will dismiss a
complaint for lack of jurisdiction only if the complainant fails to file with the EEOC within the
requisite period. See, eg., Williams v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 530 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1975); De
Gideo v. Sperry-Univac Co., 415 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Kinnan v. Central Tel. & Tel. Co.,
401 F. Supp. 1273 (W.D. Va. 1975). Courts rarely require EEOC compliance with statutory proce-
dures before allowing a litigant to institute suit because of the agency's case backlog and inability
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/5
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time period for resolution of an EEOC charge is currently thirty-two
months.25
If a discrepancy arises between the EEOC charge and the complaint,
a defendant can move to dismiss the suit on grounds that the complaint
defeats Title VII's purpose of informal grievance resolution because de-
fendant had no notice of the additional allegation and thus no opportu-
nity to conciliate the matter.26 Courts that accept this argument, in
effect, bind the plaintiff to a charge filed long before she enlisted an
attorney's help or knew the full extent of the discrimination she
suffered.27
Even though the EEOC has been reluctant to defer charges to state
agencies, 28 the deferral scheme has been criticized as causing needless
to process charges within the statutory period. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431
F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Cal. 1968);
King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
The EEOC's backlog of cases has risen from 6,133 charges at the close of its first fiscal year to
in excess of 100,000 charges in March, 1975. Much of its inability to process charges within the
statutory period is attributed to its insufficient operating budget and failure to maintain its staff at
the authorized level. One year after the EEOC obtained power to file suit, the Office of the
General Counsel had 105 vacancies out of 270 positions. In February, 1975, there were still vacan-
cies in more than 14% of the authorized positions. See Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission: Developments in the Administrative Process 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REv. 831 (1976).
For other criticisms of the EEOC, see generally Blumrosen, Developments in Equal Employment
Opportunity Law 1976, 36 FED. BJ. 55, 60 (1977); Blumrosen, The Crossroadsfor Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity: Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy?, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46
(1973).
25. See Peck, supra note 24, at 848 n.103. Although the EEOC completed 7,000 successful
conciliations in 1974 which provided $111,000,000 in benefits to over 50,000 employees, the
EEOC admits that these figures represent little more than a drop in the bucket. Address of Lowell
W. Perry, Chairman of the EEOC, September 11, 1975, cited in Casey & Slaybod, supra note 20,
at 87.
Moreover, the EEOC admitted that the exclusive reliance placed on voluntary methods ofnego-
tiation to eliminate employment discrimination was misplaced. In 1973, the EEOC achieved 2,279
successful settlements out of a total of 4,970 cases in which conciliation was attempted. Peck, supra
note 24, at 852.
26. For cases dismissing added claims, see EEOC v. Iickey-Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1117
(E.D. Mo. 1973) (added claim of sex discrimination dismissed because not within the scope of the
EEOC charge); Fix v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 320 F. Supp. 58 (D. Colo. 1970) (added claim of
religious discrimination dismissed because EEOC had no opportunity to investigate such claim).
For a case dismissing parties not joined in the original EEOC charge, see Mickel v. South
Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.) (added party dismissed on ground that
its omission from the EEOC charge prevented any voluntary conciliation), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
877 (1967). But see Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957 (D. Md. 1973).
27. See Casey & Slaybod, supra note 20, at 93-94.
28. According to EEOC regulations, 29 C.F.R. 1601.12 (1976), when a complainant files
with the EEOC without first filing with the state fair employment practices agency, the EEOC
must refer the charge to the state or local agency. See Shawe, Employment Discrimination-he
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duplication of federal efforts and delaying ultimate relief. Because it is
impossible to resolve a claim within sixty days, the deferral period does
not spur vigorous enforcement of state antidiscrimination statutes.29
Furthermore, defendants have no incentive to settle cases at the state
level during the deferral period because such settlement does not pre-
clude a federal suit.30
Title VII remedies are inadequate and fail to deter future employ-
ment discrimination.31 The statute authorizes courts to grant injunc-
tions, affirmative relief such as reinstatement or hiring, and "any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," 32 however, back pay
reduced by interim earnings is the only monetary relief commonly
awarded under Title VII.33
Back pay awards are insufficient to compensate plaintiffs for the de-
lay, emotional investment, and expense entailed in litigation,34 and
provide plaintiffs with little incentive to prosecute Title VII suits. 5 Al-
though the successful litigant can obtain attorney's fees, such grants
have not been "sufficiently generous to induce attorneys to undertake
the associated risk, to cover the extensive trial preparation costs, and to
compensate for the long and arduous Title VII litigation. 36 The statute
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Deferral Quagmire, 5 BALT. L. REv. 221
(1975), who argues that the EEOC has been reluctant to delegate portions of its work to state
agencies and has attempted to evade the deferral regulations because of the inconsistency of state
antidiscrimination laws.
29. See Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 20, at 1215. See generally
Sape & Hart, supra note 3.
30. See 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) § 1952, at 1628 (1976).
31. See generally Peck, supra note 20, at 1253-55; Symposium, supra note 3, at 510-19; Note,
Employment Discrimination Litigation, The A4 vailability ofDamages, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REy. 497
(1976).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) reads:
If the court finds the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engag-
ing in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate which may include, but is not limited to, rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Head
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474
F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
Commentators agree that the possibility of significant damage awards would encourage victims
of employment discrimination to initiate Title VII actions. See generallySymposium, supra note 3,
at 510-19; Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 20, at 1260.
34. See Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 20, at 1253.
35. See Note, Tort Remediesfor Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REv.
491, 492 (1968).
36. Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 20, at 1255.
[Vol. 1978:367
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is silent about money damages and courts have generally disallowed
both compensatory 37 and punitive38 damages, reasoning that Congress'
failure to include damages within the specific remedies of Title VII
indicates an intent to disallow this kind of relief.39
III. ALTERNATIVES TO TITLE VII
The strict procedural requirements and limited coverage of Title
VII ° compelled victims of racial and sex-based employment discrimi-
nation to seek alternative remedies.4' Relying on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Jones v. Afred H. Mayer Co., 42 victims of racial discrimina-
tion pursued relief under section 198 1. 3 In Jones, petitioner relied on
section 1982," derived from the 1866 Civil Rights Act45 and the thir-
37. Although compensatory damages generally refer to damages which compensate the in-
jured for his injury, some courts have given this term a wider meaning under Title VII. See Rosen
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (reimbursement for pension rights
from forced early retirement); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 1268
(S.D. Cal. 1975) (general damages for mental anguish); Hunter v. United Air Lines, 10 F.E.P. Cas.
787 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (interest on back pay and refund of union dues).
38. Punitive damages have become an important remedy for willful discrimination under
other civil rights statutes. See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.) (§ 1981), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967) (§§ 1983, 1985); Basista v.
Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) (§ 1983). Courts, however, have disallowed punitive damages
under Title VII. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Opara v. Modem Mfg. Co., 12 F.E.P. Cas. 378 (D. Md. 1975); Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973), appeal dismissed and remanded, 497
F.2d 180 (1974); Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Co., 10 F.E.P. Cas. 662 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
39. See Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 10 F.E.P. Cas. 730 (D. Utah 1975); Van Hoomissen v.
Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Hayes v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49
(S.D. Ga. 1968). Contra, Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Taylor v.
Ford Motor Co., 8 F.E.P. Cas. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
40. When it passed, Title VII excluded employers with 24 or less employees, private clubs,
religious associations, and state and local governments from its prohibitions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-15 (1970). These exclusions were calculated to cover over 92% of all employers and 60% of
all employees in the United States. See 110 CONG. REc. 13090 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey).
41. See Larson, The Development ofSection 1981 as a Remedyfor Racial Discrimination in
Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 56 (1972).
42. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See generally Hebert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multple Ap-
proaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 449 (1971); Note, Section
1981 & Private Discrinminatiorn An Historical Justificationfor a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1024 (1972).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Text quoted in note I1 Isupra. See note 41 supra.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
45. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenactedby § 18 of The Enforcement Act of
1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140.
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teenth amendment, to challenge respondent's racially motivated refusal
to sell property. The Court scrutinized the legislative history of section
1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and concluded that the Act prohibited
all racially motivated deprivations of the rights to contract and to
purchase property.' In Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph
Co. ,4 the Third Circuit considered the common origin of sections 1981
and 1982 and held section 1981 applicable to racially motivated exclu-
sionary employment practices.4 8
Use of section 1981 as a remedy for private employment discrimina-
tion evoked the argument that Title VII was intended to be the exclu-
sive remedy for employment discrimination.49 The Supreme Court
rejected this interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Company50 and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency.51 In Alexander,
the Court held that the submission of a discriminatory discharge claim
to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement did not
preclude a subsequent Title VII suit on the same racial discrimination
charge."2 The Court noted Congress' "general intent to accord parallel
or overlapping remedies against discrimination, '5 3 and concluded that
"[the clear inference [from the legislative history] is that Title VII was
designed to supplement rather than supplant existing laws and institu-
tions relating to employment discrimination. '54
46. 392 U.S. at 426.
47. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). Accord, Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting
Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
48. 438 F.2d at 760 ("In the context of the Reconstruction it would be hard to imagine to
what contract right [other than employment] the Congress was more likely to have been referring.
Certainly the recently emancipated slaves had little or nothing other than their personal services
about which to contract.").
49. Smith v. North American Rockwell, 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970). But see Caldwell
v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
Commentators argued that Title VII did not repeal the older civil rights statutes.,See Larson,
supra note 41, at 65-67; Note, Is Section 1981 Mod/fied by Tile VII of the Cll Rights Act of
1964, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1223.
50. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
51. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
52. 415 U.S. at 36.
53. Id. at 47. The Court cited 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for support, and noted that Con-
gress had provided several forums for consideration of employment discrimination claims without
requiring that submission of a claim to one forum precluded submission to others. Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II 1972) (EEOC); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. 11 1972) (state and
local agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. 11 1972) (federal courts)).
54. 415 U.S. at 48-49.
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In Johnson, the Court noted the independence of Title VII and sec-
tion 1981 as remedies for private employment discrimination and held
that the timely filing of a Title VII charge with the EEOC did not toll
the statute of limitations applicable to a section 1981 action on the
same facts.55 Despite the comprehensive scope of Title VII,56 the Court
concluded that Title VII did not implicitly repeal section 1981 because
they were neither coextensive in coverage57 nor in remedies.5 8 The
same reasoning supports the conclusion that Title VII does not preempt
section 1985(3) as a remedy for private employment discrimination.
Courts have refused to extend section 1981 protection to sex-based
employment discrimination.59 Thus, in League ofAcademic Women v.
Regents of the University of California,6° the court held that reenact-
ment of section 1981 subsequent to passage of the fourteenth amend-
ment did not indicate congressional intent to provide a remedy for sex
discrimination.6 I Dictum in the recent case of Runyon v. McCrar 62
Nothing in Title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights and obligations under the
NLRA and Railway Labor Act. The procedures set up in Title VII are the exclusive
means of relief against those practices of discrimination which are forbidden as unlawful
employment practices .... Of course, Title VII is not intended to and does not deny to
any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State
statutes. If a given action should violate both Title VII and the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction ....
110 CONG. Rac. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). The Senate also defeated an amendment
that would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for most unlawful employment
practices. See id at 13650-52.
55. 421 U.S. at 462-67.
56. "Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem of
invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other
remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief." Id. at 459.
57. Id. at 460 (Title VII inapplicable to certain employees covered by § 1981).
58. Id. at 461 (neither punitive nor compensatory damages are available under Title VII;
both kinds of damages have been allowed under § 1981).' For a thorough discussion of this line
of reasoning, see Larson, supra iote 41, at 65-67; Note, supra note 49, at 1230-36.
59. Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); League of Academic
Women v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Williams v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United Method-
ist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972).
Plaintiffs attempting to invoke § 1981 to combat sex discrimination argue (without success) that
§ 1981, originally enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment reveals congressional intent to
confer the rights of white citizens on all persons, and that white citizens referred only to white
males, the only persons with significant rights in 1870, thereby according women, along with
blacks, protection under § 1981. Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1008 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
60. 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
61. Id. at 639.
IT]here is nothing in the history of the Act to suggest that Congress envisioned any sex-
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supports the holding in League of 4cademic Women. In Runyon, the
Supreme Court held that section 1981 prohibits racially discriminatory
private school admissions and indicated that section 1981 applies only
to racial discrimination.63
Because courts are unwilling to extend section 1981 to sex discrimi-
nation, section 1985(3)6 provides the only alternative to Title VII to
redress private sex-based employment discrimination. Section 1985(3)
creates a cause of action against any person who conspires to deprive
another "of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws." By suing under section 1985(3) the plain-
tiff can avoid the procedural requirements and delay inherent in ob-
taining Title VII relief,65 and can control the progression of her suit.
Because the appropriate state statute of limitations governs the filing of
section 1985(3) suits, the plaintiff has a longer filing period than under
Title VII.66 In addition, most district courts disallow punitive and
compensatory damages in Title VII suits,67 but both kinds of damages
have been awarded in actions under other portions of the Civil Rights
Acts.68 Punitive damages have been awarded under section 1983,69 and
the common constitutional derivation of the Civil Rights Acts supports
ual differences when it established the white citizen standard. The statute was obviously
aimed at racial problems and inequalities relating to both black males and females ....
The Fourteenth Amendment certainly is not a mandate that every statute must be read
to outlaw all forms of discrimination.
Id.
62. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon is commented on in Note, Section 1981 and the Thirteenth
Amendment After Runyon v. McCrary-On the Doorstep of Discriminatory Private Clubs, 29
STAN. L. REV. 747 (1977). See also Note, May Desegregation Remedies Infringe the Rights of Inno.
cent Whites? The Implications of Runyon v. McCrary for Reverse Discrimination, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 211; 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 401.
63. 427 U.S. at 167. In outlining the questions the case did not raise, the Court stated it
"dofes] not present any question of the right of a private school to limit its student body to boys, to
girls, or to adherents of a particular religious faith, since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is in no way addressed
to such categories of selectivity." Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). Text quoted in note 15 supra.
65. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text.
66. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187
(9th Cir. 1962). Courts have held that the appropriate statute of limitations is that applicable to
tort actions. Hileman v. Knable, 391 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1968); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231
(6th Cir. 1968); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Some courts have
used state statutes of limitations for contract actions, Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Con-
tracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp.
420 (E.D. Pa. 1974), while others have applied a statute of limitations for liability created by
statute, Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1970); Nevels v. Wilson, 423 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1970).
67. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides that the laws of the United States shall be applied in
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their award under 1985(3) as well.7"
IV. SHOULD SECTION 1985(3) BE APPLIED TO PRIVATE
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION?
Section 1985(3), enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment,7 ' was originally part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187172
which provided civil and criminal remedies for denial of constitutional
rights to newly emancipated slaves. The legislative history of section
1985(3) fails to establish whether or to what extent Congress intended it
vindicating civil rights so far as they are appropriate but where they "are not adapted to the object
or are deficient," state law is to apply.
In Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), the court found federal common law determined
whether punitive damages were allowable under the civil rights statutes:
We believe that the benefits of the Acts were intended to be uniform throughout the
United States, that the protection of the individual to be afforded by them was not in-
tended by Congress to differ from state to state, and that the amount of damages to be
recovered by the injured individual was not to vary because of the law of the state in
which the federal court suit was brought.
Id. at 86.
69. Id. The court supported its decision with analogous awards for deprivation of other civil
rights, stating:
While a deprivation of a right to vote and deprivation of personal liberty caused by an
illegal arrest and wrongful incarceration are, of course, not identical, nonetheless the
decisions cited above provide a useful and persuasive analogy. We are of the view that
the same principles of the federal common law relating to damages in the cases cited are
equally applicable in all Civil Rights cases.
Id. at 88. See Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919) (illegal arrest and incarceration). The
Rarista court found an additional analogy in voting rights, citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927). 340 F.2d at 88.
70. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 638 (1976).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
72. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and for other Purposes, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), text quoted in note 15 supra).
Sec. 2. That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United States
. . . conspire together.., or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the prem-
ises of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or
any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immuni-
ties under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authori-
ties of any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal
protection of the laws. . . each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of
a high crime .... And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
any person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercis-
ing any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so injured or
deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery
of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any
one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy ....
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to reach private conspiracies. Congress was uniformly committed to
eradicating Klan activities, 74 but it was sharply divided over whether
section 1985(3) prohibited all private discrimination.75
As originally introduced, section 1985(3) forbade conspiracies to
deny a person his rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States "which would under any laws of the
United States. . .constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter,
mayhem, robbery, assault and battery. '76 Some members of Congress
feared that this first version of the bill would subvert state enforcement
of criminal laws.77 To avoid this problem, the statute's language was
amended to add the phrase "equal protection" and to provide for civil
rather than criminal penalties.78
73. The following commentators conclude that Congress intended § 1985(3) to reach the acts
of private individuals: R. HARRIs, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 44-52 (1960); Cox, The Supreme
Court, 1965 Term-Foreword" ConstiTutionalAdjudication and the Promotion fHuman RIghts, 80
HIARv. L. Rav. 91, 111 (1966); Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence ofan Adequate Federal
Civil Remedy, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951); Note, Federal Civil Action Against Private Individualsfor
Crimes Involving Civil Rights, 74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965). Contra, Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J.
331 (1967).
74. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 260 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Holman); id
app. 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
75. One faction thought § 1985(3) should protect the rights of national citizenship. Id. at
475-76 (remarks of Rep. Dawes), 382-83 (remarks of Rep. Hawley), app. 83-85 (remarks of Rep.
Bingham). Another faction argued that § 1985(3) should cover private conspiracies which deprive
persons of fourteenth amendment rights if the state has been lax in protecting those rights. Id. at
607-08 (remarks of Rep. Pool), 485 (remarks of Rep. Cook). A third faction believed that § 1985(3)
should apply to all private conspiracies which deprive persons of constitutional rights regardless of
the state's attempt to remedy such deprivations. Id. at 487 (remarks of Rep. Tyner), 334 (remarks
of Rep. Hoar).
76. d. at 317.
77. Id. at 382.
78. Representative Shellabarger introduced the amendment and explained why the qualify-
ing word "equal" had been added:
The change which the amendment proposes to make in section two of the original
bill as reported by the committee, so far as it relates to disputed grounds, so far as it is
not confined to infractions of right which are clearly independent of the fourteenth
amendment, referable to and clearly sustainable by the old provisions of the constitution,
is to be found in those portions of the section which are contained in the part beginning
at line twenty-five. . .. The object of the amendment is. . .to confine the authority of
this law to the prevention of deprivations which attack the equality of rights of American
citizens; that arty violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down
the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and
other citizens' rights shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section.
Id. at 478 (emphasis in original).
One commentator argues that "the addition of the word 'equal' was a term of limitation only in
the sense that Congress wished to avoid subverting the entire criminal jurisdiction of the state."
Note, supra note 73, at 1469 (emphasis in original).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/5
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Sections 1981 and 1982, enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amend-
ment, prohibit private racial discrimination.79 Section 1985(3), enacted
to enforce the fourteenth amendment, has been interpreted to require
state action.80 Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, however, argua-
bly grants Congress affirmative legislative authority8' to assure all citi-
zens minimal equality. This interpretation sanctions the use of section
1985(3) to combat sex-based private conspiracies to interfere with con-
stitutional or statutory rights.
The Court first considered whether section 1985(3) reached private
conspiracies in Collins v. Hardyman.8 2 Members of an activist political
club that opposed the Marshall Plan brought an action under 8 U.S.C. §
47(3), the predecessor of section 1985(3), alleging that defendants had
conspired to disrupt club meetings and thereby deprive members of
79. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
80. See. e.g., Ferrer v. Fronton Exhibition Co., 188 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1951); Love v. Chan-
dler, 124 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1942).
81. For cases holding that § 5 is affirmative, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d
1227 (8th Cir. 1971). For cases holding that § 5 is strictly remedial, see United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores,
508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally
R. HARRIS, supra note 73, at 53; Cox, supra note 73; Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963
Term-Foreword" Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of
the Government, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 148 (1964).
For arguments that congressional power under § 5 is purely remedial, see Avins, supra note 73;
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of
the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 497-500 (1974).
These conflicting interpretations of the scope of § 5 power were espoused by Justices Bradley
(remedial) and Harlan (affirmative) in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court struck
down the 1875 Civil Rights Act because the Act exceeded congressional power to counteract state
imposed denials of equal protection. Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued:
[Tihe power of Congress is not restricted to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State
laws or State action. It is, in terms distinct and positive, to enforce "the provisions of this
article" of amendment; not simply those of a prohibitive character, but the provi-
sions-all of the provisions--affirmative and prohibitive, of the amendment. It is, there-
fore, a grave misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the amendment has
reference exclusively to express prohibitions upon State laws or State action. If any right
was created by that amendment, the grant of power, through appropriate legislation, to
enforce its provisions, authorizes Congress, by means of legislation, operating through-
out the entire Union, to guard, secure, and protect that right.
Id. at 46-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
See generally Note, The Reach of42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Sex Discrimination as a Gauge, 25 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 331, 332-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination as a Gauge].
A recent article suggests that liberty of contract, the doctrinal basis of the Civil Rights Cases, is
now discredited and the state action theory of the Civil Rights Cases should fall as well. Nerken, A
New Dealfor the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Basis of the
Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 297, 362-63 (1977).
82. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
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their first amendment rights.8 3 Although plaintiffs carefully avoided
framing their complaint in fourteenth amendment terms,84 Justice
Jackson held that state action was an element of every section 1985(3)
claim because of the fourteenth amendment's state action require-
ment.85 He also noted that the extension of section 1985(3) to private
conspiracies would raise serious constitutional issues.
86
In dissent, Justice Burton argued that section 1985(3) was addressed
to individuals rather than state officials,87and that to read a state action
requirement into section 1985(3) would render section 1983 meaning-
less. 88 Plaintiffs were not seeking redress of their fourteenth amend-
ment rights, 89 and, he noted, Congress had the power to protect rights
existing independent of the fourteenth amendment.90
The Court again disagreed, in United States v. Guest,9 whether Con-
gress had power under section 5 to punish purely private conspiracies
through the use of 18 U.S.C. § 241,92 the criminal counterpart of sec-
tion 1985(3). Six defendants who allegedly murdered a black army
colonel in route to a new duty station were indicted for conspiring to
deprive black citizens of their right to equal utilization of state operated
public facilities, streets, and highways. 93 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stewart reasoned that because the indictment charged a conspiracy to
83. Id. at 651.
84. Id. at 655.
85. The only inequality suggested is that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting
and did not break up meetings of others with whose sentiments they agreed. To be sure,
this is not equal injury, but it is no more a deprivation of "equal protection" or of "equal
privileges and immunities" than it would be for one to assault one neighbor without
assaulting them all, or to libel some persons without mention of others. Such private
discrimination is not inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation of the
law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so.
Id. at 661. For a criticism of Justice Jackson's opinion, see Note, supra note 73, at 1469.
86. 341 U.S. at 659. The constitutional problems he noted were the breadth of Congress'
power under and apart from the fourteenth amendment, the preservation of the states' reserved
powers, and the nature of the rights of national, as distinguished from state, citizenship.
87. Id. at 663-64. "When Congress, at this period, did intend to limit comparable civil rights
legislation to action under color of state law, it said so in unmistakable terms." Id. at 664 (citing §
1983).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 663.
90. Id. at 664. Even though he did not define the source of congressional power, Justice
Burton was the first Supreme Court Justice to recognize that § 1985(3) could protect federally
created or constitutional rights not derived from the fourteenth amendment. Compare Collins, with
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
91. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
93. 383 U.S. at 747 n.l.
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deprive blacks of equal protection of the laws, section 241 would cover
the conspiracy only if there were state action. Although it contains no
explicit state action requirement, Justice Stewart concluded that section
241 "does not purport to give substantive, as opposed to remedial,
implementation to any rights secured by [the equal protection] clause
[of the fourteenth amendment]," and must require state action. 94 The
Court then found sufficient state involvement to sustain the in-
dictment.95
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurring, up-
held the indictment on the ground that section 241, enacted pursuant to
Congress' section 5 power, reaches private conspiracies to inhibit four-
teenth amendment rights.96 In a second concurrence, Justice Brennan,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas, went even further and
argued that section 241 protects rights which are "secured" by the
Constitution.97
In Griffln v. Breckenridge,98 the Supreme Court held that section
1985(3) applied to a purely private conspiracy which deprived plaintiffs
of their thirteenth amendment right to be free from the incidents of
slavery and their right to interstate travel. Black plaintiffs brought a
94. Id. at 754-55.
95. Id. at 756. Noting that the involvement of the state need not be exclusive or direct,
Justice Stewart found that the indictment alleged that part of the conspiracy was achieved by
'causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had committed crimi-
nal acts."' Id.
For a criticism of Justice Stewart's opinion and an argument that the state involvement in Guest
was so ill-defined that the finding of state action mocked the notion that state action is a viable
limitation upon the fourteenth amendment, see Note, The Troubled Waters of Section 1985(3)
Litigation, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 639, 663 (1972).
96. 383 U.S. at 761 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark statedz "I believe. . . that there
now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws
punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights." Id. at 762.
97. Id. at 782. Justice Brennan argued that § 241 protects rights which emanate from the
Constitution. The right of equal access to public highways emanates from the fourteenth amend-
ment, and § 5 empowers Congress "to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfer-
ing with the exercise of [a fourteenth amendment right] is necessary to its full protection." Id.
Justice Harlan also concurred, but he specifically stated that § 241 did not apply to private con-
spiracies. Id. at 762-63. See generally Cox, supra note 73. For a criticism of the concurring opin-
ions in Guest, see Nichol, An Examination of Congressional Powers Under § Five of the 14th
4mendaent, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 175, 183 (1976); Note, Private Inteference with an Individual's
Civil Rights. A Redressable Wrong Under § Five of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 120, 134-36 (1975).
98. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Griffin is commented on in: 23 BAYLOR L. Rv. 277 (1971); 40 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 635 (1972); 85 HARv. L. REv. 95 (1971); 3 SETON HALL L. Rav. 168 (1971); 1972 U.
ILL. L.F. 199; 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 780 (1971); 47 WASH. L. REv. 353 (1971).
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section 1985(3) action against two white defendants who had detained
their automobile and assaulted them believing that one plaintiff was a
civil rights worker.99 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stewart
determined that neither the language,1'° legislative history,10 nor com-
panion provisions0 2 precluded the application of section 1985(3) to
private conspiracies. The Court concluded that Congress had power
under the thirteenth amendment'° 3and the right to travel' °4 to reach
the alleged private conspiracy through section 1985(3).105 Justice Stew-
art noted the similarity between the language of section 1985(3) and
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment,l ° which had been held to re-
quire state action,"0 7 but said:
A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has, in other words,
made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons. Yet
there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working
the deprivation to come from the State.108
99. 403 U.S. at 90-91.
100. Id. at 96-98. Unlike the language of § 1983, that of § 1985(3) does not require that
defendants conspire "under color of state law," and the Court concluded that § 1985(3) which
speaks of "two or more persons conspiring or going into disguise on the highway or the premises
of anothee' encompasses private conduct. Id. at 96.
101. Id. at 99-102.
102. The Supreme Court noted that there are three possible forms of a state action limitation
on § 1985(3): action under color of state law, interference with or influence upon state authori-
ties, or a private conspiracy so massive that it supplants state authorities. Section 1983, the first
clause of § 1985(3), and § 3 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, respectively, deal with each of these
possibilities. Id. at 98-99.
103. Id. at 105. Congress was authorized by § 2 of the thirteenth amendment to determine the
badges and incidents of slavery, legislate against them, and impose liability on private persons
who violate the legislation. Id
104. Id. at 105-06. The Court found defendants' conspiracy denied plaintiffs their right to
interstate travel, a right of national citizenship which Congress has power to protect from private
as well as public interference. Id
Presumably, any right of national citizenship is within the aegis of § 1985(3). Rights of na-
tional citizenship include: the right to vote in a federal election, Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); the right to protection while in the custody of federal officers, Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892); the right to inform federal officials of federal law violations, In re Quarles, 158
U.S. 532 (1895); and the right to travel from state to state, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1867). This view accords with the legislative history of § 1985(3). See CoNG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., app. 189 (1871) (remarks of Mr. Williard).
105. 403 U.S. at 104 (1971). See generally Note, The Scope of Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1977).
106. 403 U.S. at 96.
107. Id. at 97.
108. Id.
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The Court recognized Congress' broad affirmative legislative au-
thority to protect voting rights under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Katzenbach v. Morgan."9 The Court upheld section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965110 which invalidated New York's literacy
requirement for certain Puerto Ricans as a prerequisite for voting.11'
The Court concluded that section 5 was "a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'1
12
In Oregon v. Mitchell,"I3 the Court upheld a ban on literacy tests and
durational residency requirements for voting in presidential elections
under the Voting Rights Act Amendments 1 4 as a valid exercise of
Congress' section 5 power.1 15 Courts have also found that section 5
enables Congress to regulate an individual's activities that prevent the
states from protecting fourteenth amendment rights.' 16 One commenta-
tor has argued that it is unreasonable to hold that Congress has power
to legislate against private conspiracies that prevent a state from grant-
ing its citizens equal protection of the laws, but to deny Congress the
power to legislate against purely private infringements of those
rights."17
Lower courts have taken inconsistent positions on whether state ac-
tion is an element of a section 1985(3) cause of action for deprivation of
109. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970).
111. 384 U.S. at 643.
112. Id. at 651. In analyzing the case, Professor Cox has said that Morgan "left no doubt that
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress power to deal with conduct outside the
scope of section 1 and within the reserved power of the states where the measurement is a means
of securing the state's performance of its fourteenth amendment duties, regardless of past compli-
ance or violations." Cox, supra note 73, at 103.
113. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
114. Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 314, 316, 318 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1,
1973bb-1 (1970)).
115. 400 U.S. at 118. Section 5, however, did not empower Congress to lower the voting age
m state and local elections. Id. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented from
the Court's holding that nothing in the Constitution authorizes Congress to lower the voting age in
state and local elections. Id. at 135 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 229 (Brennan, White, Marshall,
JJ., dissenting).
116. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (Congress has power to punish private indi-
viduals who joined with local officials in murdering civil rights workers); Exparte Riggins, 134 F.
404 (N.D. Ala. 1904) (Congress has power under the fourteenth amendment to impose criminal
sanctions for interference with states according its prisoners due process of law).
117. See Cox, supra note 73, at 112.
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fourteenth amendment rights. 118 The court, in Milner v. National Insti-
tute of Health,"9 ingeniously avoided the state action controversy.
Plaintiff alleged she was fired from her job for obtaining a divorce and
that the Institute did not similarly discriminate against divorced men.
Although the court held that state action was required in a 1985(3) suit
alleging a private conspiracy to deprive persons of fourteenth amend-
ment rights, 20 it sustained plaintiff's claim because her dismissal vio-
lated Title VII which creates a federally protected right to be free from
sex-based employment discrimination. 12 1
118. The Seventh Circuit has held that state action is required to sustain a § 1985(3) claim
because the fourteenth amendment only prohibits state imposed discrimination while the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits have held that Congress has power under § 5 to enforce fourteenth amend-
ment rights against private conspiracies. See e.g. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir. 1975); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974); Westberry v. Gilman
Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), the court dismissed a lawyer's allega-
tions that defendant conspired to deprive him of office space in violation of § 1985(3) because
state action was required. Writing for the court, Judge (now Justice) Stevens said that the omission
of "under color of state law" from § 1985(3) merely alleviates plaintiffs proof that defendant's
conduct arose under the guise of state law. A plaintiff must still plead and prove state action if he
claims he was deprived of fourteenth amendment rights because "section 1 of [the fourteenth]
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong-
ful." Id. at 194 n.9 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
In Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), the Eighth Circuit relied on the concurring
opinions in Guest and held that § 1985(3) could be used against civil rights demonstrators who had
contirtually interfered with the church services of a white parish. The court concluded that fie
fourteenth amendment protects the first amendment rights of freedom of worship and assembly
and that Congress had power to protect these rights from private interference under § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. Although Griffin left the door open for a reexamination of Guest, the
court did not believe the Supreme Court would reject the views of the concurring justices in Guest
because the fourteenth amendment and § 1985(3) were too closely connected as to date of passage,
authorship, and purpose. Id. at 1236. In Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.
1975), the Fifth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Action and held that § 1985(3)
affords a civil remedy without regard to state action for a conspiracy to deprive persons of the
equal treatment of the laws. Although the case was dismissed as moot on a rehearing en banc, the
substance of the original opinion was not rejected. Id. at 216.
See generally Comment, Constitutional and Jurisdictional Problems in the Application of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), 52 B.U.L. REv. 599 (1972); Comment, "State Action" in the Seventh Circuit, 59
MARQ. L. REv. 809 (1976); Comment, Expansion of Remedies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 37 Mo.
L. REv. 525 (1972); Note, supra note 97; 54 N.C.L. REv. 677 (1976).
119. 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Sex Discrimination as a Gauge, supra
note 81, at 365-69.
120. 409 F. Supp. at 1394.
121. Id. at 1394-95. AccorZ Local 1, Teamsters Union v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa.
1976). In Local1, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Executive Board of the Teamsters from directing
a merger of Local 1 into another local. Plaintiffs sued under § 1985(3) alleging that the forced
merger violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights, and that it was an unlawful retalia-
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Milner's holding clearly comports with the Supreme Court's analysis
in Griffin 122 that section 1985(3) prohibits private conspiracies that de-
prive persons of rights secured by the Constitution or valid federal
laws. Because Title VII is a constitutional exercise of Congress' com-
merce power 23 which is intended to prohibit employment discrimina-
tion, the section 1985(3) action brought in Milner was proper. This
approach is also consistent with United States v. Waddell,124 in which
the Supreme Court held that section 241125 prohibited a private con-
spiracy that deprived plaintiff of his right, secured by federal statute, to
homestead. 12
6
Although section 241, unlike section 1985(3), expressly covers pri-
vate conspiracies that deprive persons of rights secured by federal stat-
utes, case law under section 241 can be used to extend section 1985(3)'s
coverage. The criminal and civil portions of the civil rights statutes
have generally been considered in pari materia. 27 Extending section
1985(3)'s civil protections to rights secured by federal statute is an
tion by Teamsters President Fitzsimmons for the Local's political differences with the Interna-
tional. Rejecting the constitutional arguments, the court held that the deprivation of the right to
express views contrary to the leadership of the International was cognizable under § 1985(3) be-
cause that right was protected by § 101 of the Labor Management Relations Disclosure Act.
29 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
122. See notes 98-108 supra and accompanying text.
123. See Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839,
aff'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1968); S. REP. No. 872, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964), reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2366.
At the outset a formidable obstacle to a favorable decision on S.1732 appeared to be an
1883 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court holding unconstitutional an 1875 statute pro-
viding criminal penalties for denials of service by public facilities or accommodations on
account of race, color, or religion. This 1875 law was expressly based on the 14th amend-
ment, but the Supreme Court could not find the requisite "State action" in denials of
service by privately owned establishments. There is a large body of legal thought that the
Court would either reverse the earlier decision if the question were again presented or
that changed circumstances in the intervening 80 years would make it possible for the
earlier decision to be distinguished. That question, however, was not before the commit-
tee for the instant measure is based on the commerce clause.
1d.
124. 112 U.S. 76 (1884). See generaly Sex Discrimination asa Gauge, supra note 81, at 366-67.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). In United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918), the Supreme
Court limited the scope of § 241 to protection of personal rights to avoid its being construed as a
general federal tort law: "The right or privilege to be guarded [under § 241], as indicated both by
the language employed and context, was a definite, personal one, capable of enforcement by a
court, and not the political, nonjudicable one common to all, that the public shall be protected
against harmful acts, which is here relied on." Id. at 226-27. Compare Bathgate, with Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
126. 112 U.S. at 79, 89.
127. See In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 1975); Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Com-
merce, 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1968); Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958).
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insignificant federal intrusion into private relationships that are al-
ready protected by its criminal counterpart.
Despite the logic of Milner,'25 the Fourth Circuit, in Doski v.
Goldseker, 29 held that a plaintiff may not use section 1985(3) to en-
force her Title VII right to be free from sex-based employment discrim-
ination. Plaintiff alleged that several of the defendant company's male
employees had conspired to fire, her because of her sex in violation of
Title VII. The court noted that although Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency 30 held litigants could concurrently pursue remedies for racial
employment discrimination under Title VII and section 1981, Title VII
preempted all other remedies for sex discrimination.' 3' The court rea-
soned from the legislative history of Title VII and Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Company1 32 that Congress intended the older civil rights
statutes to protect only those rights which existed prior to Title VII.
Because there was no preexisting right to be free from sex-based dis-
crimination, plaintiff was foreclosed from a section 1985(3) remedy.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of Title
VII and its reading of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company are inac-
curate. Both statements pertain only to a litigant's election of remedies
and not to the sources of rights which may be protected by section
1985(3) and other civil rights statutes. 133 The Milner rule 34 is more
consistent with the judicial approval of concurrent remedies for em-
ployment discrimination.
Section 1985(3) can and should be used to combat private sex-based
employment discrimination. A plaintiff seeking relief under section
1985(3) must surmount two additional hurdles: she must establish con-
spiracy and class-based animus.
V. THE SINGLE ENTITY RULE
Conspiracy is an essential element of a section 1985(3) cause of ac-
128. See notes 119-27 supra and accompanying text.
129. 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976).
130. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
131. 539 F.2d at 1334.
132. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Doski court quoting 41exander, stated: "Title VII was designed
to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws," 539 F.2d at 1334 (quoting 415 U.S. at 48-49),
and that the legislative history of Title VII indicated that: "neither the provisions regarding the
individual's right to sue under Title VII nor any other provision of this bill, are meant to affect
existing rights granted under other laws." Id.
133. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 49-58, 119-27 supra and accompanying text.
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tion.135 A criminal conspiracy is a "combination of two or more per-
sons to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, ... or to
accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by crimi-
nal or unlawful means."' 36 Many lower courts have dismissed section
1985(3) suits for employment discrimination reasoning that a corporate
or business defendant and its agent cannot conspire; because the
agent's actions are imputed to the principal, the necessary plurality for
a conspiracy is lacking.'37 The single entity rule-that a corporation is
a single "person" and cannot conspire with itself-has some support in
criminal law;' 3 1 it was substantively developed in the civil law in
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,13 9 an antitrust case. Many
courts blindly adhere to the single entity antitrust rule in employment
discrimination litigation."4
135. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
136. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 123 (1842). Seegenerally W. LAFAVE &
A. ScorT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 454 (1972).
137. See e.g. Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Rubenstein v. University
of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Chambliss v. Foote, 421 F. Supp. 12
(E.D. La. 1976), aff'dper curiam, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977); Rushton v. Shea, 419 F. Supp.
1349 (D. Del. 1976); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
Jones v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 397 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Girard v. 94th St. & 5th
Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888
(D. Conn. 1975).
138. See Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909); United States v.
Santa Rita Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 113 P. 620 (1911). Contra, Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d
477 (3d Cir. 1939); State v. Parker, 158 A. 797 (Conn. 1932).
See Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. Rnv. 920, 951-53 (1958). A
corporation's criminal intent is imputed from the intent of its agent. Thus, the rationale for the
single entity rule is that there is no plurality of human minds and no mutual encouragement. A
combination between an agent and the corporation may have greater antisocial effects than the act
of an individual; however, the essence of conspiracy is still concerted human action. Under this
view, conspiracy would exist when two or more agents of a single entity are involved.
When a corporation acts through more than one person to accomplish an antisocial end,
the increased likelihood of success, potentially more serious effects of the contemplated
offense, and the danger of further unlawful conduct which are the essence of conspiracy
rationales are present to the same extent as if the same persons combined their resources
without incorporation. Society is benefited by viewing a corporation as a single legal
entity only when it acts for proper ends. The policy should not be construed as requir-
ing treatment of the group as an individual when it plans antisocial activities. In addi-
tion, to apply these agency principles to criminal conspiracy would allow corporate
agents to act inter sese with relative impunity, fearing only a corporate fine, the burden
of which may not affect them, should the object of the conspiracy be punished. On the
other hand conspirators not operating within a corporate framework might under similar
circumstances face imprisonment.
Id. at 953.
139. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
140. See note 137 supra.
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In Nelson Radio, plaintiff charged defendant Motorola with violat-
ing section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with its officers and
directors to restrain trade through the use of agreements with Motorola
distributors that forbade them from selling any product manufactured
by defendant's competitors.14 ' The case was dismissed because the
complaint failed to allege the requisite conspiracy for a section 1 viola-
tion. A careful reading of the opinion reveals that the court held only
that a corporation could not conspire with itself to restrain trade in its
own products. The conspiracy which plaintiff had alleged was simply a
business decision made by the corporation's manager as to the nature
and extent of the market the corporation would serve. 142 Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, said the court, was not meant to regulate such ordi-
nary intracorporate decisions. 143
The rule is inapposite in employment discrimination cases because
sex-based hiring decisions are unrelated to the corporation's opera-
tions, assets, profitability, or growth. Rarely, if ever, will two or more
business entities conspire to deny employment to women because of
their sex. Such an agreement is more likely to exist among members of
a single business entity who should be liable for conspiring in violation
of section 1985(3). The single entity rule frustrates the purpose of sec-
tion 1985(3) to redress deprivations of federally protected rights.
Some courts have developed an exception to the single entity rule to
141. 200 F.2d at 912.
142. [Ilt appears plain to us that the conspiracy upon which plaintiff relies consists sim-
ply in the absurd assertion that the defendant, through its officers and agents, conspired
with itself to restrain its trade in its own products. Surely discussions among those en-
gaged in the management, direction and control of a corporation concerning the price at
which the corporation will sell its goods, the quantity it will produce, the type of custom-
ers or markets to be served, or the quality of goods to be produced do not result in the
corporation being engaged in a conspiracy in unlawful restraint of trade under the Sher-
man Act.
Id. at 914.
143. Id. An alternative basis for the holding in Nelson Rado is that § 1 of the Sherman Act
is not aimed at a single corporation acting through its agents but at two or more corporations
conspiring. To hold that a corporation can conspire with itself under § 1 of the Sherman Act
would render § 2 of the Act superfluous as § 2 prohibits individual acts which monopolize or are
an attempt to monopolize trade. Under this theory, there is no reason for extending the single
entity rule beyond antitrust cases. See 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1170-71 (1953). See also White Bear
Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942). The single entity rule is
especially appropriate in antitrust actions. The purpose of the antitrust laws is to maintain compe-
tition. In turn, competition fosters price stability and assures the best possible market perform-
ance. To achieve these purposes, it is usually unnecessary to regulate purely intracorporate
decisions; competition will direct these decisions to socially desirable ends. L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 20-21 (1977).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/5
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avoid its hardship. In Dupree v. Hertz Corp.,'4 the court held that a
conspiracy under section 1985(3) can exist among the officers and di-
rectors of a single corporation if the corporation is large, has repeatedly
engaged in discriminatory practices, and if the plaintiff is not challeng-
ing a formally adopted corporate policy.145 This rationale, however, is
unsatisfactory because several isolated acts of discrimination by a sin-
gle business entity would not amount to a conspiracy. 146 Further, this
rationale would neither apply to small corporations nor to the imple-
mentation of a formal corporate policy throughout a large corporation.
There is no reason to uphold the single entity rule in section 1985(3)
actions; the Dupree exception allows most intracorporate conspiracy to
continue unchecked. Public policy requires that the eradication of sex-
based employment discrimination not be frustrated by the single entity
rule. 147
VI. SEX DISCRIMINATION IS CLASS-BASED AND INVOLVES
INVIDIOUSLY DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS
Section 1985(3) requires an intent to deprive a person of equal pro-
tection or of equal privileges and immunities. 48 In Griffin v.
Breckenridge, the Court held that "class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus"'4 9 satisfies the intent requirement. 50 The Court found
that section 1985(3) prohibits racial discrimination,1 5 1 but it did not de-
cide whether sex discrimination involves class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus."' Several lower courts have held, without
144. 419 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Accord, Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F.
Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
145. 419 F. Supp. at 766.
146. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 70, at 634.
147. See note 173 infra and accompanying text.
148. 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons. . . con-
spire. . . for the purpose of depriving ... any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws. ... (emphasis added).
149. 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). "The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpret-
mng § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional
purpose--by requiring.. . the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the
sponsors of the limiting amendment." Id.
150. The Court distinguishes this intent standard from willfulness. Id.
151. Id. at 103.
152. The Court did, however, refer to a portion of the congressional debate on § 1985(3)
which indicates that the statute may cover class-based conspiracies which are not racially moti-
vated. Id. at 102 n.9.
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called a private conspir-
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explanation, that sex discrimination activates section 1985(3). 153
These lower courts were correct in holding that sex discrimination
involves class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 15 4 Like race,
sex generally bears no relation to an employee's ability to perform a
job.' -55 Although racial discrimination in employment may involve
more overt hostility than sex-based discrimination, an employer's con-
duct need not be motivated by hatred to be actionable under section
1985(3).156 An employment decision based on stereotypic class attrib-
utes rather than personal qualifications provides the requisite intent;
sex discrimination premised upon archaic notions of a woman's proper
societal role should therefore activate section 1985(3).157
acy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or a set of men against another to
prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for burning down his
barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against a
man because he was a Democrat... or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a
Vermonter. . . then this section could reach it.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 567 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
153. Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Reichardt v. Payne,
396 F. Supp. I010 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth 4mendments:
'Constitutional Authorityfor Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L.
Rnv. 313 (1977). Professor Calhoun argues that judicial refusal to extend § 1985(3) to private sex
discrimination makes less sense than the refusal to apply §§ 1981 and 1982 to sex discrimination
because § 1985(3) contains no language which would invite an interpretation restricting it to race
discrimination. She also notes the Court's inclusion of state supported sex discrimination in § 1983
as suggestive that the Court would not disapprove construing § 1985(3) to encompass sex dis-
crimination. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
154. As in the, Negro problem, most men have accepted as self-evident, until recently,
the doctrine that women had inferior endowments in most of those respects which carry
prestige, power, and advantages in society, but that they were, at the same time, superior
in some other respects. The arguments, when arguments were used, have been about the
same: smaller brains, scarcity of geniuses and so on. The study of women's intelligence
and personality has had broadly the same history as the one we record for Negroes.
G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1077 (1944).
155. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Title VII permits sex-based em-
ployment discrimination if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of a particular business or enterprise. EEOC guidelines provide that the
bona fide occupational qualification exception is applicable only to job situations that require
specific physical characteristics necessarily possessed by one sex, e.g., employment of actors, ac-
tresses, or fashion models. 29 C.F.R. 1604.2. See Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,
545-46 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
156. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
157. If our women are, to be emancipated from subjection to the law which God has
imposed upon them, if they are to quit the retirement of domestic life, where they preside
in stillness over the character and destiny of society; . . . if, in studied insult to the
authority of God, we are to renounce in the marriage contract all claim to obedience, we
shall soon have a country over which the genius of Mary Wolstonecraft would delight to
preside, but from which all order and all virtue would speedily be banished. There is no
form of human excellence before which we bow with profounder deference than that
which appears in a delicate woman,. . . and there is no deformity of human character
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/5
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Although section 1985(3) does not require that discriminatory ani-
mus be directed toward a suspect class,'58 judicial determination that a
class is suspect involves recognizing that discrimination against that
class is inherently invidious. 59 Consequently, the criteria of suspect-
ness may aid in determining whether sex discrimination should activate
section 1985(3).160 The Court has held that a class is suspect if its mem-
bers exhibit an immutable, readily identifiable characteristic, if it has
been subjected to a history of purposeful discrimination, and if it has
been relegated to a position of political powerlessness.1 6 ' Women as a
class satisfy all three criteria, 162 but the Supreme Court has never ex-
from which we turn with deeper loathing than from a woman forgetful of her nature,
and clamourous for the vocation and rights of men.
G. MYRDAL, supra note 154, at 1074 (quoting A. BLEDSOE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERTY AND SLAVERY
223-25 (1857)).
158. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
159. Harrison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1350 (1st Cir. 1975).
160. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See generally Ginsburg, Gender in the
Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 S. CT. REV. 1; Note, Sex Discrimination andEqual
Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971); Comment,
Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 481 (1971).
161. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
Professor Michelman suggests that suspect classifications embody three characteristics: 1) a
general ill-suitedness to the advancement of any proper governmental objective; 2) a high degree
of adaptation to uses which are oppressive in the sense of systematic and unfair devaluation,
through majority rule, of the claims of certain persons to nondiscriminatory sharing in the
benefits and burdens of social existence; 3) a potency to injure through an effect of stigmatizing
certain persons by implying popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeserving-
ness. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword" On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 19-20 (1969).
162. The history of discrimination against women and their inferior status is well documented
by statutes and case law. Women could not hold office, serve on juries, sue in their own name, or
hold or convey property. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). Nor could they
engage in prestigious careers. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (state law
prohibiting women from practicing law held constitutional). In Bradwell, Justice Bradley decreed:
"ITihe paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). See generally
L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 5-6 (1969).
Women were politically powerless without the right to vote. Thomas Jefferson once commented
that, "were our state a pure democracy there would still be excluded from our deliberations...
women, who, to prevent deprivation of morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix promiscu-
ously in gatherings of men." M. GRUBERG, AMERICAN WOMEN IN PoLrrics 4 (1968).
Discrimination against women was believed to benefit women as well as society:
In this country we believe that the general good requires us to deprive the whole female
sex of the right of self-government. They have no voice in the formation of the laws
which dispose of their persons and property .... We treat all minors much in the same
way.... Our plea for all this is, that the good of the whole is thereby most effectually
promoted ....
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plicitly recognized sex as a suspect class.' 63
The Court has historically deferred to gender-based legislative
classifications."6 Recently, however, the Court has scrutinized gender-
based classifications under a standard "more deferential than the 'strict
scrutiny' exercised in challenges to suspect classifications and impinge-
ments of fundamental interests, but more exacting than the 'rational
basis' test traditionally applied to economic and social welfare
legislation."'1 65
In 1971 the Court held, in Reed v. Reed,166 that an Idaho statute
preferring males for appointment as administrators of estates violated
the fourteenth amendment. Although the Court framed the issue in
deferential language,167 it rejected the stated legislative purpose and
found that sex discrimination for the purpose of administrative conven-
ience is "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause."' 68 Using similar reasoning, a plurality of the
Court held gender-based classifications suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson.1 69 After Frontiero the Court re-
G. MYRDAL, supra note 154, at 1074 (quoting A. BLEDSOE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERTY AND SLAVERY
223-25 (1857)).
163. See generally Comment, EqualProtection ofthe Laws: Sex is not a Suspect Classifikation,
27 U. FLA. L. REV. 288 (1974). See notes 164-73 infra and accompanying text.
164. Under the rational relationship test, the statute's classifications must bear a rational rela-
tionship to its stated purpose to withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (statute exempting all women from jury service held constitutional, but case is qualified by
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)); Goessaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan
statute forbidding women from bartending unless they were related to a male owner upheld under
the equal protection clause); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (statute limiting women
to a 10-hour work day held to have a rational basis: "[iH]er physical structure and a proper dis-
charge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being
of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of men.");
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (law forbidding women from practicing law held
to have a rational basis).
165. 7he Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 177 (1977). See Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive
Classfi/cations, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974).
166. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Ginsburg, supra note 160.
167. 404 U.S. at 76. The issue was "whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants
for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to [the] state objective."
168. Id. See generally The Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 118-19 (1972).
169. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (administrative convenience did not justify a federal statute which
gave servicemen housing allowances upon listing their wives as dependents, but allowed ser-
vicewomen similar benefits only upon proof that their husbands were actually dependent).
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treated from strict scrutiny 17 0 and established an intermediate standard
of review in Craig v. Boren,' 7" stating that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of these objectives."'172
Congress has legislatively determined that sex-based employment
discrimination is invidious by including sex discrimination within the
prohibitions of Title VII and by enacting the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. The strong congressional policy against sex-discrimination,
73
170. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), aff'd on rehearing, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (Court
found no rational basis for Utah statute requiring divorced husbands to support their sons until
age 21 but their daughters only until age 18); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (claim by
male naval officer that federal statute according women a 13 year tenure before mandatory dis-
charge for lack of promotion discriminated against men rejected under rational relationship test);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (claim that California disability insurance ex-
cluding pregnancy benefits discriminated against women rejected on grounds that the challenged
classification was not "based on gender as such"); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida
statute granting widows but not widowers an annual $500 property tax exemption has rational
basis).
171. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig is commented on in:42 Mo. L. REV. 470 (1977); 29 U. FLA.
L. REv. 583 (1977).
172. 429 U.S. at 197. The Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under 21 and females under 18. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan found that
Oklahoma statistics showing .18% of young females as compared with 2.0% of young males had
been arrested for drunk driving failed to demonstrate that the statute's gender-based classification
substantially served the state's goal of promoting traffic safety. "[P]roving broad sociological pro-
positions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the norma-
tive philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection clause." Id. at 204.
The Court invoked the Craig test in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), to invalidate a
provision of the Social Security Act that granted survivor's benefits to all widows, but only to
widowers who derived at least half their support from their wives.
173. Congress' concern over sex discrimination is evidenced in the legislative history of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-26, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment and devel-
opment is frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies have shown that women are
placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and the less remunerative positions on
the basis of their sex alone.
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that
Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964 ....
In recent years, the courts have done much to create a body of law clearly disapprov-
ing of sex discrimination in employment. Despite the efforts of the courts and the Com-
mission, discrimination against women continues to be widespread and, is regarded by
many as either morally or physiologically justifiable.
This Committee believes that women's rights are not judicial divertissements. Discrim-
ination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment
practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of
unlawful discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2140-41.
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and judicial recognition of sex-based classifications as functionally sus-
pect174 show that charges of sex discrimination should trigger section
1985(3).
The lax definition of "class" adopted by some lower courts in section
1985(3) claims adds further support for its use to remedy sex discrimi-
nation. Without discussing whether defendant's actions were motivated
by "reverse" discriminatory animus, the Eighth Circuit, in Action v.
(annon, 175 upheld a section 1985(3) claim by whites alleging depriva-
tion of first amendment rights. In Westberry v. Gilman Paper
Co. ,176 the Fifth Circuit found that environmental activism could give
rise to sufficient "'class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus be-
hind the alleged actions of the conspirators' to evidence subject matter
jurisdiction. . . under 1985(3).1 7 7 Although these decisions may extend
the Grin 171 analysis too far, courts that are willing to accept jurisdic-
tion in these circumstances should find sex discrimination clearly ac-
tionable under section 1985(3).
VII. CONCLUSION
Equal employment opportunity-the right to choose an occupa-
tion-is necessary to develop self-respect, participation, and social re-
sponsibility.179  While Title VII has remedied much sex-based
employment discrimination, its procedures have simultaneously frus-
trated many legitimate claims.'80 The Supreme Court has held that vic-
tims of employment discrimination may pursue alternative remedies to
Title VII.'81 Section 1985(3) is such an alternative and may be used to
174. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Tem-Foreword" Equal Citizenshp Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 54 (1977).
175. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
176. 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975). See note 118 supra.
177. 507 F.2d at 210. But see Kimble v. DJ. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 1978)
(no class-based animus found for class of oil industry personal injury claimants under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(2)). Kimble conflicts with Westberry's broad construction of a § 1985(3) class. It should not
hamper § 1985(3)'s use in sex discrimination cases because Kimble defines a class as a group with
inherent common characteristics.
178. See notes 148-52 supra and accompanying text.
179. Professor Karst envisions the fourteenth amendment as a guarantor of equal citizenship
and defines equal citizenship to include three overlapping values: respect, participation, and re-
sponsibility. He argues that women will realize equal citizenship only if the traditional patriarchal
stereotype of "woman's role" is abolished and that to the extent that stereotype is embodied in the
law or is socially imposed, "the principle of equal citizenship presumptively requires intervention
by the courts." Karst, supra note 174, at 55.
180. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 50-58 supra and accompanying text.
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combat sex-based employment discrimination.
If the Supreme Court ultimately holds that Congress has power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to extend fourteenth
amendment prohibitions to private conduct, section 1985(3) will clearly
apply to sex discrimination claims.' 82 Even if the Court adheres to a
restrictive interpretation of section 5, the litigant may avoid the state
action problem by arguing that section 1985(3) protects the federally
created Title VII right to be free from sex-based employment
discrimination. 83
Because courts and legislators have endeavored to eradicate sex-
based employment discrimination, it should activate section 1985(3). 184
Courts have a duty to see that legitimate section 1985(3) claims are not
dismissed because of the single entity rule or a narrow construction of
intent.185 Section 1985(3) should play a significant role in ending sex-
based employment discrimination.
Celine Ellett Duke
182. See Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 113-17; Note, supra note 95, at 675.
183. See notes 119-27 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 135-47 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 166-73 supra and accompanying text.
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